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Abstract
We consider keyless authentication for point-to-point communication in the presence of a myopic adversary. In
particular, the adversary has access to a non-causal noisy version of the transmission and uses this knowledge to
choose the state of an arbitrarily-varying channel between legitimate users. The receiver succeeds by either decoding
accurately or correctly detecting adversarial interference. We show that a channel condition called U-overwritability,
which allows the adversary to make its false message appear legitimate and untampered with, is a sufficient condition
for zero authentication capacity. We present a useful way to compare adversarial channels, and show that once an
AVC becomes U-overwritable, it remains U-overwritable for all “less myopic” adversaries. Finally, we show that
stochastic encoders are necessary for positive authentication capacity in some cases, and examine in detail a binary
adversarial channel that illustrates this necessity. Namely, for this channel, we show that when the adversarial channel
is degraded with respect to the main channel, the no-adversary capacity of the underlying channel is achievable
with a deterministic encoder. Otherwise, provided the channel to the adversary is not perfect, a stochastic encoder
is necessary for positive authentication capacity; if such an encoder is allowed, the no-adversary capacity is again
achievable.
Index Terms
Authentication, keyless authentication, arbitrarily-varying channel, myopic adversary, channel capacity
I. Introduction
When communicating over unsecured channels, verifying the trustworthiness of a received signal is critical. Thus,
it may be useful for a receiver to declare adversarial tampering, even if it cannot decode the message perfectly. This
allows for messages to be rejected unless they are confirmed to be trustworthy. This is known as authentication. We
consider authentication over an arbitrarily-varying channel (AVC) with an adversary who has some noisy version
of the transmitted sequence. An AVC is a channel that takes as inputs both the legitimate and an adversarial
transmission [2], where the adversarial transmission (called a state) may be maliciously chosen with the goal of
causing a decoding error at the receiver. A plethora of variations on the AVC appear in the literature, in which
the adversary has varying degrees of power and knowledge of the legitimate transmission, and the transmitter and
receiver may or may not have access to shared secret information. In the case of authentication, we say that the
decoder is successful if one of the following scenarios occurs: (1) the adversary is not active, and the decoder
recovers the correct message, or (2) the adversary is active and the decoder either recovers the correct message or
declares adversarial interference. This is a relaxation of the classical AVC, where the decoder is successful if and
only if it correctly recovers the transmitted message. Indeed, we find that authentication is “easier” in the sense
that the AVC capacity can be zero, even though the authentication capacity for the same channel is positive (or
even unchanged from the no-adversary setting).
The current work lies at the intersection of two broader areas of previous study: authentication over AVCs
(with an adversary oblivious to the transmitted sequence), and traditional error correction over AVCs with myopic
adversaries. Lying squarely in the former category are [3], [4]. In [3], a channel condition called overwritability is
introduced, and it is shown that authentication can be achieved with high probability for non-overwritable AVCs
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2at positive (but asymptotically vanishing) rates. The results are extended in [4], where overwritability is shown to
completely classify authentication capacity over an (oblivious adversary) AVC, with all non-overwritable channels
having capacity equal to the non-adversarial capacity of the AVC. Meanwhile, more knowledgeable adversaries
over the AVC were studied in [5], [6], [7], [8]. The capacity of an AVC with a myopic adversary who does not
have knowledge of the codebook realization (i.e., the legitimate users share common randomness) is characterized
in [5]. The authors of [6] give the capacity of the AVC in the case where the legitimate users have a sufficiently
large shared key, and the adversary can see the transmission sequence (i.e. the channel input) perfectly. In [7], the
authors give bounds on the capacity of an AVC in the presence of a power-constrained myopic adversary, showing
that once the channel to the adversary is bad enough, it is essentially oblivious. In the context of Gaussian channels,
[8] examines the case where both the transmitter and myopic adversary are quadratically power-constrained.
In this paper, we focus on keyless authentication when the adversary has full knowledge of the encoding procedure,
and some limited knowledge of the transmitted sequence. More specifically, the adversary chooses a state based on
a non-causal noisy version of the legitimate transmission, as well as full knowledge of the codebook being used,
but no direct knowledge of the message being transmitted. The adversary is not power-constrained, a freedom that
is reasonable given we are considering authentication and not pure error-correction, and the possible attacks by the
adversary are determined by the AVC between legitimate users.
Prior work on authentication with a variety of more capable adversaries includes [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14].
Simmons [9] considered authentication in the case where the adversary knows the encoding procedure and may
intercept the transmission perfectly, but the legitimate users are allowed some shared key with which they randomize
their choice of codebook. In [10], Maurer considers authentication for secret key agreement in the setting where each
of the legitimate users and the adversary have access to a random variable, the three of which are correlated in some
way. In that model, the adversary may substitute its transmission for that of the actual transmitter (over an otherwise
noiseless channel), with the goal of hoodwinking the legitimate receiver; the (authentication) capacity is characterized
by whether the joint distribution is simulatable by the adversary. An inner bound on keyless authentication capacity
is given by Graves, Yu, and Spasojevic in [12] for the case in which the adversary knows both the encoding procedure
and the message, but does not have any additional knowledge of the transmitted sequence, which is allowed to be
the output of a stochastic encoder. Lai, El Gamal, and Poor [11] consider authentication in the presence of a myopic
adversary who carries out impersonation or substitution attacks; the transmitter and receiver are allowed a shared
secret key. The attacks considered in the current work reduce to substitution attacks when the underlying AVC
allows for direct modification of a transmission. This model is extended in [13], where the authors additionally
provide inner bounds for the keyed and keyless authentication capacities with impersonation/substitution attacks,
and extend the simulatability condition of [10] to characterize nonzero capacity for this set of attacks. Finally, [14]
improves on the inner bounds of [11], [13] for keyed authentication.
A myopic adversary model bridges the gap between oblivious and omniscient adversaries. As mentioned above,
authentication capacity over the AVC in the presence of an oblivious adversary is characterized in [4] by the
channel condition of overwritability. In this work, we show that an analogous condition for a myopic adversary
called U-overwritability, first introduced in [1], is a sufficient condition for zero authentication capacity for both
deterministic and stochastic encoders. When we are restricted to deterministic encoders, a sufficiently capable
adversary becomes essentially omniscient, giving more cases of zero authentication capacity; interestingly, when
we allow for stochastic encoders, the authentication capacity has the potential to increase to the non-adversarial
capacity of the underlying channel, which is illustrated by example. These results naturally lead to the questions
about the relationships between the possible channels to the adversary: namely, how capable can an adversary be
before the channel becomes U-overwritable? We examine this question by endowing the set of channels to the
adversary with a partially ordered set structure, showing that the up-set of any U-overwritable channel gives a set
of channels which also lead to U-overwritability. This relationship is perhaps most useful when we know or want
to say something about U-overwritablility for omniscient or oblivious adversaries.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the model and necessary notation. We give several
cases for which the authentication capacity is zero in Section III, and demonstrate that there are cases where the
deterministic authentication capacity is zero but a stochastic encoder allows for a positive authentication capacity.
Section IV gives results derived by comparing different channels to the adversary. In Section V, we examine a
specific binary model, proving that when the channel is not U-overwritable, the authentication capacity is equal to
the underlying non-adversarial capacity, and that stochastic encoders must be used to achieve this in a portion of
3cases. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. Preliminaries
Notation: Throughout the paper, an (M, n) code is a code with M codewords and block length n. The notation
H(·) will indicate the binary entropy function, ‖ · ‖ will denote the Hamming weight of a vector, E will denote
expected value, ⊕ will be used to indicate (coordinate-wise) modulo 2 addition, and “ ❝ ” will indicate a Markov
chain. A random variable will be denoted using a capital letter, with the corresponding alphabet and alphabet
elements written with script and lowercase. For example, X is a random variable with alphabet X such that for all
x ∈ X, PX(x) (or P(x) when the random variable is understood) is the probability that X = x. If PX(x) is an integer
multiple of 1/n for all x ∈ X, we write τX to indicate the type class corresponding to PX (i.e. the set of vectors of
length n whose empirical distributions match the distribution PX). Finally, we define the typical set T (n)ǫ (X) to be
the set of sequences x ∈ Xn such that the empirical probability of each x ∈ X in x is within ǫ · PX(x) of PX(x). We
may write T (n)ǫ when the random variable(s) are clear from context.
We consider authentication when there is a legitimate transmitter and receiver as well as an active adversary who
induces some channel state at each transmission. We assume that the adversary has full knowledge of the codebook
of the legitimate parties, though not necessarily of the specific transmission being sent. More formally, let WY |X,S
be a discrete memoryless adversarial channel with the sets X,S, and Y as the input, state, and output alphabets.
In the event of multiple channel uses, we write W(y | x, s) for the product channel, where the sequence lengths are
understood. Similarly, there is a discrete memoryless channel between the legitimate transmitter and the adversary
given by UZ|X , where Z is the output alphabet at the adversary, so that the adversary has a noisy version z of any
transmitted sequence x with probability U(z | x). See Figure 1 for a depiction of this setup.
Transmitter
F
W(y | x, s) Receiver
φ
U(z | x)
Adversary
J(s | z)
i ∈ [M]
Xi ∈ Xn y ∈ Yn
iˆ ∈ [M] ∪ {0}
s ∈ Sn
Xi ∈ Xn
z ∈ Zn
Fig. 1. The transmitter sends a length-n sequence Xi := F(i), which is the (possibly stochastic) encoding of a message i ∈ [M]. The adversary
views a noisy version z of this transmission and sends state s to the channel between transmitter and receiver. The receiver then receives y,
whose probability is conditioned on both the legitimate transmission and the adversarial state, and decodes to φ(y) ∈ [M] ∪ {0}, where “0”
is a declaration of adversarial interference.
A myopic adversary will be formally defined by a distribution JS n|Zn , where the adversary’s choice of J may
depend on U and on the codebook used by the legitimate users. Notice that the adversary has a noncausal noisy
view of the transmission, so that they may view the entire block length before choosing a state. The case in which
the adversary’s choice is deterministic, as in [5], is included in the above definition.
Let s0 ∈ S and the corresponding constant state sequence s0 ∈ Sn represent the state in which there is no
adversary: i.e. WY |X,S=s0 is a non-adversarial channel. An (M, n) authentication code for W is an encoder/decoder
pair, where the encoder is possibly stochastic:
F : {1, 2, . . . ,M} → Xn
φ : Yn → {0, 1, 2, . . . ,M},
where an output of “0” under φ indicates a declaration of adversarial interference. The decoder φ is successful if
(1) the output is equal to the input message, or (2) s , s0 and the output is equal to 0. In other words, the decoder
either successfully detects adversarial interference, or decodes correctly.
4There are a variety of ways to formally define a stochastic encoder (also called a randomized encoder), all of
which allow the transmitter to make use of some local randomness. We use the following (see, e.g. [15], pg. 550).
Definition II.1. Given a message set [2nR], a stochastic encoder generates a codeword in Xn for m ∈ [2nR] according
to some conditional distribution PX|M(x | m).
Let φ−1(A) ⊆ Yn represent the set of channel outputs which decode to some i ∈ A under φ, and let φ−1(A)c be the
complement in Yn of this set. Let Xi := F(i) denote the length-n encoding of message i; notice that if the encoder
is stochastic, F(i) can take on one of several values, and so Xi is a random variable. Given transmitted message i
and choice of myopic adversary J, we define the probability of error for the authentication code (F, φ) as:
e(i, J) = EX|i

∑
z
U(z | X)J(s0 | z)W(φ−1(i)c | X, s0) +
∑
s,s0
∑
z
U(z | X)J(s | z)W(φ−1({i, 0})c | X, s)
 (1)
where the expectation is over the realizations of the stochastic encoder conditioned on message i being sent. If the
adversary is absent, then J(s0 | z) = 1 for all z ∈ Zn. We denote this distribution by Js0 , and observe that with this
choice of adversarial action, (1) reduces to the standard error probability given that message i is transmitted.
e(i, Js0) = EX|i
[
W(φ−1(i)c | X, s0)
]
.
Similarly, if the adversary decides that J(s | z) = 1 for all z ∈ Zn and some particular s , s0, denoted Js,
e(i, Js) = EX|i
[
W(φ−1({i, 0})c | X, s)
]
.
The above two cases show the reduction to the so-called oblivious case, in which the adversary has no knowledge
about the transmission before choosing a state vector s, and so should simply choose s to optimize its chances of
causing decoding failure.
We assume that each message in [M] := {1, 2, . . . ,M} is transmitted with equal probability. Then the average
probability of error over all possible messages for a given adversarial choice of J is given by
e(J) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
e(i, J). (2)
The maximal probability of error is given by
emax(J) = max
i
e(i, J). (3)
Remark II.2. For fixed i and any choice of J, e(i, J) ≤ maxs e(i, Js), implying that supJ e(i, J) = maxs e(i, Js).
However, since the maximizing choice of s may differ by message i, and a myopic adversary has access to some
information about i, this does not imply that e(J) ≤ maxs e(Js) for all J. This marks a fundamental difference from
the oblivious adversary model: in that case, an adversarial strategy is defined by a specific choice of s that is made
independent of the transmitted message, and the probability of error for that choice is given by e(s) = 1
M
∑
i e(i, s).
Here, it is clearly true that e(s) ≤ maxs e(s) for every choice of adversarial strategy s.
We say that a rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence of (2nR, n) authentication codes such that supJ e(J)→
0 as n → ∞, or supJ emax(J) → 0 as n → ∞. We will primarily consider the average probability of error in this
paper, and will explicitly state when we are claiming a stronger achievability result (i.e. with reference to the
maximal probability of error). Notice that supJ e(J) is the highest error probability the adversary can hope for,
achieved by designing J optimally. The authentication capacity Cauth is the supremum of all achievable rates. Let
C denote the capacity in the no-adversary setting (i.e., J = Js0).
The work in [4] shows that a channel property called overwritability exactly determines when the authentication
capacity is nonzero for oblivious adversaries.
Definition II.3. An adversarial channel WY |X,S with no-adversary state s0 is overwritable if there exists a distribution
PS |X′ such that ∑
s
PS |X′(s | x′)W(y | x, s) = W(y | x′, s0) for all x, x′, y. (4)
5Less formally, over an overwritable channel, an adversary can seamlessly make their own false message appear
legitimate to the receiver without being detected.
Theorem II.4. [4] If a channel with an oblivious adversary is not overwritable, then Cauth = C; if it is overwritable,
Cauth = 0.
Overwritability should be compared with symmetrizability for the standard AVC problem [16]: WY |X,S is sym-
metrizable if there exists PS |X′ such that
∑
s PS |X′(s | x′)W(y | x, s) =
∑
s PS |X′(s | x)W(y | x′, s) for all x, x′, y. In [4] it
is shown that overwritability implies symmetrizability, but that the converse does not hold. Since a classical AVC has
zero capacity if and only if it is symmetrizable [16], this implies that the authentication capacity can be positive even
though the AVC capacity is zero. There is an equivalence between overwritability and simulatability, as introduced
in [10], when the adversary is oblivious to the transmission but has complete control over the communication
channel (i.e. can substitute in its transmission for the legitimate transmission at will).
When the adversary is not oblivious, we propose a modification of overwritability, called U-overwritability, that
will help us to characterize capacity in the myopic case.
Definition II.5. We say that an adversarial channel WY |X,S with no-adversary state s0 is U-overwritable, where
UZ|X is a conditional distribution, if there exists a distribution PS |X′,Z such that∑
s,z
U(z | x)PS |X′,Z(s | x′, z)W(y | x, s) = W(y | x′, s0) ∀x, x′, y. (5)
Let 1Z|X be the deterministic identity distribution: that is, 1(z | x) = 1 if z = x, and zero otherwise. This
corresponds to the case of a so-called omniscient adversary, and induces a special case of U-overwritability, as
defined below.
Definition II.6. An adversarial channel WY |X,S with no-adversary state s0 is I-overwritable if there exists a
distribution PS |X′,X such that ∑
s
PS |X′,X(s | x′, x)W(y | x, s) = W(y | x′, s0) ∀x, x′, y. (6)
With the introduction of a noisy channel to the adversary, there are several relevant problems in terms of
authentication. The first is characterizing the channel capacity given an AVC WY |X,S and a channel UZ|X to the
adversary. Another is determining the robustness of a channel WY |X,S against myopic adversaries: in other words,
what is the “best” channel to the adversary that the legitimate users can withstand (i.e. still transmit reliably with
a positive rate). We consider these problems in the remainder of the paper.
III. Zero Authentication Capacity
In this section, we characterize the conditions under which the authentication capacity is zero. In Section III-A,
we consider the case where we are restricted to deterministic encoders. Section III-B shows that these results do
not necessarily hold when the encoder is allowed some local randomness.
First, we give a result that will apply to both deterministic and stochastic encoders.
Theorem III.1. If the channel to the adversary is given by UZ|X and WY |X,S is U-overwritable, Cauth = 0.
Proof. SupposeWY |X,S is U-overwritable, and let PS |X′,Z be the distribution guaranteed by Definition II.5. Consider a
sequence of (2nR, n) authentication codes with fixed R > 0, and let M := 2nR. Let J˜(s | z) = 1
M
∑M
j=1 EX′ | j
[
PS |X′,Z(s | X′, z)],
where the expectation is over the stochastic encoding of message j. Then,
e(J˜) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
e(J˜, i) (7)
≥ 1
M2
∑
i, j
EX|i

∑
s,z
U(z | X)EX′ | j [PS |X′,Z(s | X′, z)]W(φ−1({i, 0})c | X, s)
 (8)
=
1
M2
∑
i, j
EX|i
[
EX′ | j
[
W(φ−1({i, 0})c | X′, s0)
]]
(9)
6≥ 1
M2
∑
j
∑
i, j
EX′ | j
[
W(φ−1( j) | X′, s0)
]
(10)
≥ 1
M2
∑
j
∑
i, j
(1 − e( j, Js0)) (11)
≥ M − 1
M
 1M
∑
j
(1 − e( j, Js0))
 (12)
≥ M − 1
M
(
1 − e(Js0)
)
, (13)
where (9) follows from U-overwritability and (10) follows because j ∈ {i, 0}c as long as i , j. The deterministic
distribution Js0 is as defined in Section II. Since supJ e(J) ≥ e(J˜) and supJ e(J) ≥ e(Js0),
sup
J
e(J) ≥ M − 1
M
(
1 − e(Js0)
) ≥ M − 1
M
(
1 − sup
J
e(J)
)
.
We conclude that supJ e(J) ≥ M−1M
(
1 − supJ e(J)
)
. This reduces to supJ e(J) ≥ M−12M−1 , which approaches 1/2 as
n → ∞. Thus, Cauth = 0. 
A. Deterministic Encoders
The encoder f of a (2Rn, n) authentication code is deterministic if each message i ∈ [2Rn] has a single associated
codeword f (i) := xi ∈ Xn that will be transmitted across the channel WY |X,S . That is, if f is a function from [2nR] to
Xn. For deterministic encoders, knowing the message is synonymous with knowing the transmitted sequence. Thus,
in this scenario, if the adversary can reliably decode the message, we can consider them as an essentially omniscient
adversary. We show for the set of deterministic encoders that if the no-adversary channel between legitimate users
is stochastically degraded with respect to the channel to the adversary, then I-overwritability guarantees Cauth = 0.
Definition III.2. We say that a channel PY |X is stochastically degraded with respect to PZ|X if there exists PY |Z such
that for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y:
PY |X(y|x) =
∑
z∈Z
PY |Z(y|z)PZ|X(z|x).
Theorem III.3. Suppose that WY |X,S=s0 is stochastically degraded with respect to UZ|X. Then, if WY |X,S is I-
overwritable, and we are restricted to a deterministic encoder, Cauth = 0.
Proof. Suppose that WY |X,S is I-overwritable, and let PS |X′,X be the distribution guaranteed by I-overwritability.
Because WY |X,S=s0 is stochastically degraded with respect to UZ|X , there exists PY |Z such that for all x, y, we have∑
zU(z|x)PY |Z(y|z) = W(y|x, s0). Consider a sequence of (2nR, n) authentication codes with R > 0, and let M :=
2nR. With an abuse of notation, we will let φ(y) denote either a message or a codeword; they are in one-to-one
correpondence due to the assumption of a deterministic decoder. Let
J˜(s | z) = 1
M
M∑
j=1
∑
y
PS |X′,X(s | x j, φ(y))PY |Z(y | z),
where φ is the non-adversarial decoding rule of the legitimate receiver. Then,
e(J˜) ≥ 1
M2
∑
i, j,s,z,y
U(z | xi)PS |X′,X(s | x j, φ(y))
· PY |Z(y | z)W(φ−1({i, 0})c | xi, s) (14)
=
1
M2
∑
i, j,s,y
W(y | xi, s0)PS |X′,X(s | x j, φ(y))W(φ−1({i, 0})c | xi, s) (15)
≥ 1
M2
∑
i, j,s,
y s.t. φ(y)=i
W(y | xi, s0)PS |X′,X(s | x j, φ(y))W(φ−1({i, 0})c | xi, s) (16)
7=
1
M2
∑
i, j,s
[
1 − e(i, Js0)
]
PS |X′,X(s | x j, xi)W(φ−1({i, 0})c | xi, s) (17)
=
1
M2
∑
i, j
[
1 − e(i, Js0)
]
W(φ−1({i, 0})c | x j, s0) (18)
≥ 1
M
∑
i
[
1 − e(i, Js0)
]  1M
∑
j,i
W(φ−1( j) | x j, s0)
 (19)
≥ 1
M
∑
i
[
1 − e(i, Js0)
]  1M
∑
j,i
[
1 − e( j, Js0)
] (20)
=
 1M
∑
i
[
1 − e(i, Js0)
]
2
− 1
M2
∑
i
[
1 − e(i, Js0)
]2
(21)
=
[
1 − e(Js0)
]2 − 1
M2
∑
i
[
1 − e(i, Js0)
]2
(22)
≥ [1 − e(Js0)]2 − 1M (23)
where (15) follows from stochastic degradation, and (18) follows from I-overwritability. Thus, supJ e(J) >
[
1 − e(Js0)
]2−
1
M
≥ [1 − supJ e(J))]2 − 1M , and
sup
J
e(J) ≥
3 −
√
5 + 4
M
2
We conclude that supJ e(J) is bounded away from zero as n → ∞, and thus that Cauth = 0. 
B. Stochastic Encoders
When a stochastic encoder is used, the adversary has knowledge of the distribution PX|M, though not necessarily
the specific transmitted message or sequence. In this case, the ability of a myopic adversary to determine the
intended message does not imply that it has perfect knowledge of the transmission itself. As the latter may be
necessary for successful malicious interference, this constitutes the distinction from the work in Section III-A.
For the model in which the adversary has perfect knowledge of the message and encoding procedure, but is
completely oblivious the transmission sequence itself, [12] gives an example of a channel for which stochastic
encoding will increase the channel capacity. This example is expanded below to the model in which the adversary
has a noisy version of the transmission (from which it may or may not deduce the message). Via this example,
we demonstrate the necessity of the deterministic encoder condition in Theorem III.3. In the proof of Theorem
III.3, the deterministic encoder makes an appearance in Equation (17), where knowledge of φ(y) = i is treated as
equivalent to knowledge of xi.
Recall that binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability p, denoted BSC(p), is a binary-input,
binary-output channel such that the probability the output differs from the input is equal to p. A binary erasure
channel (BEC) with erasure probability p outputs an erasure symbol with probability p, and otherwise transmits
binary inputs reliably.
Example III.4. In this example, we exhibit a channel with the property that unless the adversary has perfect
knowledge of the transmitted codeword, the receiver will be able to authenticate with high probability. Over this
channel, a deterministic encoder results in Cauth = 0, but we will show that a stochastic encoder will allow for a
positive authentication capacity.
Consider a binary-input channel with output alphabet {0, 1, ε}, where ε denotes an erasure symbol. The adversary
either chooses not to act (denoted s0), or chooses a state equal to 0 or 1. If the adversary does not act, the channel
operates as a BSC(p). If the adversary inputs a 0 or 1, there are two possibilities: if the chosen state symbol
matches the transmitted symbol, the channel operates as a BSC(1− p). Otherwise, the transmitted symbol is erased.
An example is shown in Figure 2. Notice that the adversary causes authentication failure if and only if it is able
8x s W(y | x, s) y
s0
1
s0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
BSC(p)
BSC(1 − p)
BSC(p)
BEC(1)
BSC(1 − p)
BEC(1)
0/1
0/1
1/0
ε
1/0
ε
Fig. 2. The word x=011001 is sent. The adversary chooses state sequence s = s01s0100. For the positions in which the adversary has
chosen not to act, the channel is a BSC(p), where we assume without loss of generality that p < 0.5. When the adversary’s state matches
the transmitted symbol, the channel statistics flip. The fourth and the sixth symbols in the output sequence y will be erasure symbols, since
the transmitted symbol and state symbol do not match. Thus, in this example, the receiver can declare with absolute confidence that there
has been adversarial interference.
ti
0
1
0
1
γ
Most likely x’s given ti
• ••
•
••
Most likely x’s given z
z
Fig. 3. The message i is encoded as ti, and is passed through a BSC(γ), whose output is x. The adversary observes z after x is passed
through a BSC(q). Given z, the adversary can decode reliably to ti, but there remains ambiguity about the realization of the sequence x.
to simultaneously flip enough bits to convince the receiver that a different message was sent, and not trigger any
erasures whatsoever.
It is straightforward to see that the channel is I-overwritable. Suppose, then, that the channel to the adversary is
a BSC(q), where q ≤ p. By Theorem III.3, Cauth = 0 if the encoder is deterministic. However, we will show that a
stochastic encoder will allow for positive authentication capacity. To do so, we design a stochastic encoder as follows.
Let γ > 0, and encode the message i using a deterministic binary code designed for the BSC concatenation of a
BSC(γ) and a BSC(p); call this codeword ti. Next, simulate an artificial BSC(γ) and send the output of this simulated
channel, denoted x, through the AVC. The non-adversarial channel to the receiver is now the concatenated channel
for which the code was designed, and so messages are transmitted reliably in the absence of an adversary. Meanwhile,
the channel to the adversary is less noisy than the main channel, and so we assume that given its observation z,
the adversary can determine the codeword ti. However, it cannot exactly determine the actual transmitted sequence
x. For an illustration of this, see Figure 3.
In order to avoid being detected, the adversary can either send s0 or s = x, and in order to cause a decoding error,
it must manipulate enough symbols that the receiver decodes to an incorrect codeword t j,i. Because the adversary
cannot be certain of the exact realization of the transmitted sequence, we conclude that if it acts, it is detected with
high probability. In other words, this channel has positive capacity. By making γ sufficiently small, the capacity of
the concatenated channel approaches the capacity of the underlying BSC(p), allowing our coding scheme to have
rates approaching the latter.
Example III.4 is high-stakes: if the adversary makes any mistake whatsoever, it is discovered. Section V examines
a more forgiving scenario, where the adversary may flip the BSC channel statistics in whichever time slots it chooses,
without needing to know the transmitted sequence. We show that a stochastic encoder also allows for positive (and,
in fact, no-adversary) authentication capacity in this case.
9IV. Relationships between myopic adversaries
A myopic adversary spans the gap between oblivious adversaries (as in [4]) and omniscient adversaries, who
have perfect access to the transmitted sequence. Thus, when the legitimate transmitter and receiver have use of a
particular communication channel WY |X,S , there may be some point at which the adversary becomes capable enough
that the channel is U-overwritable, bringing the authentication capacity to zero. Since not every pair of potential
channels to the adversary are directly comparable, we address this transition with the use of a partial ordering on
channels UZ|X given by stochastic degradation: formally, U2Z|X ≤ U1Z|X if and only if U2Z|X is stochastically degraded
with respect to U1
Z|X. Examples IV.1 and IV.2 illustrate some features of this partial order.
Example IV.1. The channel to the adversary in the oblivious case (i.e. the case in which Z is independent of
X) is stochastically degraded with respect to any other channel UZ|X. On the other hand, every channel UZ|X is
stochastically degraded with respect to the omniscient channel (UZ|X = 1Z|X). Thus, these extremes give the unique
maximum (omniscient adversary) and minimum (oblivious adversary) elements of our partial order.
Example IV.2. As an example of a totally ordered chain within the partial order, consider the set of binary symmetric
channels. The BSC(p) is stochastically degraded with respect to the BSC(q) if and only if 0.5 ≥ p ≥ q ≥ 0. The
maximum element of the chain is the BSC(0) (omniscient adversary), and the minimum is the BSC(0.5) (oblivious
adversary). See Figure 4.
Using the partial order of stochastic degradation, we may compare channels and then use these comparisons to
draw conclusions about U-overwritability.
Theorem IV.3. If U2
Z′ |X is stochastically degraded with respect to U
1
Z|X, and WY |X,S is U
2-overwritable, then WY |X,S
is also U1-overwritable.
Proof. Let PS |X′,Z′ be the distribution guaranteed by U2-overwritability, and let PS |X′,Z(s|x′, z) =
∑
z′ PS |X′,Z′(s|x′, z′)PZ′ |Z(z′|z),
where PZ′ |Z is the distribution guaranteed by stochastic degradation. Then,∑
s,z
U1(z|x)PS |X′,Z(s|x′, z)W(y|x, s) =
∑
s,z,z′
PZ′ |Z(z′|z)U1(z|x)PS |X′,Z′(s|x′, z′)W(y|x, s)
=
∑
s,z′
U2(z′|x)PS |X′,Z′(s|x′, z′)W(y|x, s)
= W(y|x′, s0).
We conclude that WY |X,S is U1-overwritable. 
Theorem IV.3 implies that overwritability is a stronger condition than U-overwritability, formalized in the
following corollary.
Corollary IV.4. If a channel WY |X,S is overwritable, then it is U-overwritable for every channel UZ|X.
Proof. The channel to an oblivious adversary is stochastically degraded with respect to every channel UZ|X. The
result follows by Theorem IV.3. 
Clearly, if the adversary can successfully generate a false message given a noisy version of a transmission, it is
also successful in the noiseless case. This is formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary IV.5. If a channel WY |X,S is U-overwritable for some UZ|X, then it is also I-overwritable.
Proof. Every channel UZ|X is stochastically degraded with respect to 1Z|X. The result follows by Theorem IV.3. 
Example IV.6. Extending Example IV.2, we see that if WY |X,S is U-overwritable for UZ|X =BSC(p), then it is
U-overwritable for UZ|X =BSC(q) for all q ≤ p, and the authentication capacity is equal to zero whenever the
channel to the adversary is a BSC(q) for q ≤ p. See Figure 4.
Example IV.7. By the contrapositive of Corollary IV.5, if a channel is not I-overwritable, then it is not U-
overwritable for any UZ|X . As an example, consider the following AVC: X = F2, Y = F2 ∪ {ε}, S = {0, 1, s0}, and
W(y | x, s) is a binary erasure channel (BEC) operating on x with erasure probability s if s = 0, 1. If s = s0, we
define the erasure probability to be equal to p.
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BSC(0.5)
(oblivious adversary)
BSC(0)
(omniscient adversary)
BSC(p)
Cauth = 0
Fig. 4. The binary symmetric channels are totally ordered by stochastic degradation. If WY |X,S is U-overwritable for UZ|X =BSC(p), then
the authentication capacity Cauth is equal to zero for that UZ|X and all binary symmetric channels with smaller crossover probability.
First, we observe that if the channel is I-overwritable, then p = 1: indeed, if there exists PS |X′,X such that∑
s
PS |X′,X(s | x′, x)W(y | x, s) = W(y | x′, s0)
for all x, x′, y, then, letting x′ = y = 0 and x = 1, we have 0 = 1 − p; we conclude p = 1. Thus, for all p < 1, the
channel is not I-overwritable. It cannot then be U-overwritable for any channel UZ|X to the adversary.
In fact, we can show that the authentication capacity is equal to C = 1 − p for any value of p and any channel
to the adversary. The converse follows from the capacity of the underlying BEC(p). To see achievability, design a
code of rate 1 − p − δ for a BEC(p) with vanishing error probability, and decode as follows:
(1) If there is a single codeword consistent with the observed sequence, decode to that codeword.
(2) If there is more than one codeword consistent with the observed sequence, declare adversarial interference.
The only error that may occur is when the adversary is not present, and we declare an error in step (2). However,
this would constitute a regular decoding error in our code for the BEC(p). Thus, as n → ∞, the probability of this
type of error goes to zero. In all, then, we have shown that rates arbitrarily close to 1 − p are achievable.
Remark IV.8. In general, it is straightforward to see that the existence of a distribution PS |X′,Z (resp. PS |X′X)
satisfying the equality in Definition II.5 (resp. Definition II.6), and thus the U-overwritability (resp. I-overwritability)
of a channel, may be determined via linear programming. Once U-overwritability has been determined for a
particular choice of UZ|X , Theorem IV.3 allows us to determine U-overwritability for less degraded channels.
V. A Myopic Binary Adversarial Channel
In this section, we examine in detail a binary model that we believe will provide insight into the more general
case. In this model, the adversary views the transmitted codeword through a BSC(q), and decides on a binary state
sequence s, which is added to the transmission x. The sequence x⊕ s is then transmitted across a BSC(p). We call
this the myopic binary adversarial channel with parameters p and q, and denote it by MBACp,q.
Remark V.1. Consider an MBACp,q such that 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 0.5. We first claim that WY |X,S is not U-overwritable as
long as q > 0 and p < 0.5.
Indeed, suppose WY |X,S is overwritable. Then there exists PS |X′,Z such that for any choice of x, x′, and y,∑
s,z
U(z | x)PS |X′,Z(s | x′, z)W(y | x, s) = W(y | x′, s0).
If x = x′ = y = 0, then the above reduces to:∑
s,z
U(z | 0)PS |X′,Z(s | 0, z)W(0 | 0, s) = W(0 | 0, 0).
We then have
1 − p =
∑
s,z
U(z | 0)PS |X′,Z(s | 0, z)W(0 | 0, s)
= (1 − 2p)(1 − q)PS |X′,Z(0 | 0, 0) + q(1 − 2p)PS |X′,Z(0 | 0, 1) + p.
So,
1 = (1 − q)PS |X′,Z(0 | 0, 0) + qPS |X′,Z(0 | 0, 1).
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If q > 0, this can only occur if PS |X′,Z(0 | 0, 0) = PS |X′,Z(0 | 0, 1) = 1, and thus, PS |X′,Z(1 | 0, 0) = PS |X′,Z(1 | 0, 1) = 0.
With this in mind, let x = 1 and x′ = y = 0. In this case, we may show that
1 − p = p = 0.5.
Thus, if q > 0 and p < 0.5, the channel is not U-overwritable, where UZ|X is a BSC(q).
Next, consider the boundary cases: if q > 0 and p = 0.5, the channel has non-adversarial capacity 1−H(0.5) = 0.
The final case is that in which q = 0. In this case, the channel is U-overwritable, or equivalently, I-overwritable:
indeed, choose PS |X′,Z=X to be deterministic such that s = x′ + x.
A. When the adversary is more myopic than the receiver
We begin with the case in which the channel to the adversary is stochastically degraded with respect to the
non-adversarial channel WY |X,S=s0 between legitimate users. That is, 0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1/2. By our arguments in Remark
V.1, the channel is never BSC(q)-overwritable in this case, and so we cannot make use of Theorem III.1. In fact, we
show that the authentication capacity is not only nonzero when q > p, but that we can achieve the non-adversarial
capacity with a deterministic encoder.
Theorem V.2. If 0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1/2, the authentication capacity Cauth is equal to the non-adversarial capacity
C = 1 − H(p). Moreover, this rate can be achieved with a deterministic encoder.
Theorem V.2 converse proof. Since any authentication code must also be an error-correcting code for the underlying
non-adversarial channel, we have Cauth ≤ CBSC(p) = 1 − H(p). 
Per the MBACp,q model, the adversary can see a noisy version of the transmitted codeword. In our proof of
achievability, we will strengthen the adversary in order to simplify some arguments. Proving achievability for a
stronger adversary simultaneously proves the result for any weaker adversary. Specifically, we introduce an oracle
who will reveal to the adversary the exact distance d of the transmitted codeword, xi, from the received word
z. Generally speaking, even given this information, there remain enough potentially transmitted words to make
the adversary’s task difficult. We will also allow the adversary to be aware of the exact error pattern, e, of the
BSC(p) between the transmitter and receiver, so that it can design the state knowing the exact difference between
the transmission and what the receiver will see. That is, the adversary can add the state s′ = s ⊕ e, so that the
receiver will see xi ⊕ s′ ⊕ e = xi ⊕ s. To simplify our analysis, we will simply assume the adversary adds s and
there is no additional channel noise from the BSC(p). However, the decoder will still assume there has been some
channel noise and decode appropriately (i.e. the receiver does not have any increased knowledge).
We first present two lemmas that will allow us to choose a good codebook. The first is a variation of Lemma 3
from [16]. In each, let M := 2nR.
Lemma V.3 ([16]). Let ǫ1 > 0 and let x1, . . . , xM be drawn uniformly at random from the type class of type PX .
With high probability, this codebook satisfies the following. For any type class τXX′S and any sequence s,
|{i : ∃ j , i s.t. (xi, x j, s) ∈ τXX′S }| ≤ 2n|R−I(X;X′S )+|R−I(X′;S )|
+|++nǫ1 . (24)
The proof of the following lemma appears in Appendix A.
Lemma V.4. Let codewords x1, . . . , xM be drawn independently and uniformly at random from some type class τX .
For each type class τZ , and each z ∈ τZ , the number of messages i such that ‖xi ⊕ z‖ = d is, with high probability
in n, bounded below by ⌊
1
(n + 1)8
2n(R−I(X;Z))
⌋
,
where we let pX|Z be the conditional distribution of pairs of words in their respective type classes that are distance
d apart, as follows:
pX|Z(1|0) = d
2npZ(0)
+
1
2
− pX(0)
2pZ(0)
pX|Z(0|1) = d
2npZ(1)
+
1
2
− pX(1)
2pZ(1)
.
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Combining Lemma V.4 with the fact that |H (t) − H(t ± ǫ)| ≤ −ǫ log2(ǫ/2) for ǫ < 1/4 yields the following
corollary.
Corollary V.5. Given ǫ < 1/4 and X,Z ∼ Bernoulli(1/2), if z ∈ T (n)ǫ (Z), |d−nq| ≤ nǫ, and R = 1−H(p)+5ǫ log2 ǫ/2,
then the number of codewords messages distance d from z is, with high probability, bounded below by⌊
1
(n + 1)8
2n(R−1+H(d/n)+ǫ log2 ǫ/2)
⌋
≥
⌊
1
(n + 1)8
2n(H(q)−H(p)+7ǫ log2 ǫ/2)
⌋
.
We now prove achievability with a deterministic encoder.
Theorem V.2 achievability proof. Let δ˜n be an arbitrary sequence such that nδ˜n ≥
√
n log2 n and limn→∞ δ˜n = 0 For
convenience, set δn := −δ˜n log2 δ˜n/2.
Suppose 0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1/2. For n sufficiently large, and without loss of generality, let R = 1 − H(p) − 5δn >
1 − H(q) + 8
n
log2(n + 1) + 2δn. We construct a (M := 2
nR, n) code family with vanishing probability of error.
Encoding: By Lemmas V.3 and V.4, for n sufficiently large, there exist codewords x1, . . . , xM from the type class τX ,
where X ∼ Bernoulli(1/2), such that: (1) for every z ∈ T (n)
δ˜n
(Z) where Z ∼ Bernoulli(1/2), the number of codewords
that are distance d from z, where |d − nq| ≤ nδ˜n, is bounded below by 2n(H(q)−H(p)−7δn− 8n log2(n+1)), and (2) for any
type class τXX′S and any sequence s, (24) holds. Given a message i ∈ [M], transmit xi.
Decoding: Let ǫ > 0 be sufficiently small. Given an output y ∈ {0, 1}n, decode to message i ∈ [M] if i is unique
with the property that ‖xi ⊕ y‖ < n(p + δ˜n). Otherwise, declare adversarial interference by outputting “0”.
Probability of error analysis: Define
S (z, d) := {i ∈ [M] : ‖z ⊕ xi‖ = d},
E(s) := {i ∈ [M] : ∃ j , i s.t. ‖xi ⊕ s ⊕ x j‖ < n(p + δ˜n)}.
That is, S (z, d) is the set of messages in [M] whose corresponding codewords are distance d from z ∈ {0, 1}n, and
E(s) is the set of messages i in [M] such that adding s to xi results in the decoder potentially confusing the intended
message with a false message j. Let JS|Z,D be adversary’s choice of distribution given knowledge of the distance
to the transmitted codeword, which is given by the random variable D. For fixed J, e(i, J) is the probability of
decoding error given that message i was sent. Then,
e(J) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
P(error | i) (25)
=
∑
i,s,z,d
P(error | i, s, z, d)P(i | s, z, d)J(s | z, d)P(z, d) (26)
=
∑
i,s,z,d
P(error | i, s, z, d)P(i | z, d)J(s | z, d)P(z, d) (27)
Since every message whose codeword is distance d from z is equiprobable
P(i | z, d) =

1
|S (z,d)| if i ∈ S (z, d),
0 otherwise.
Observe that P(error | i, s, z, d) = 0 if for every j , i, ‖xi ⊕ s⊕ x j‖ ≥ n(p+ δ˜n). In other words, P(error | i, z, s, d) = 0
if i < E(s). Then, (27) is bounded as follows:
∑
s,z,d
J(s | z, d)P(z, d)
M∑
i=1
P(error | i, s, z, d)P(i | z, d) ≤
∑
s,z,d
J(s | z, d)P(z, d) · |S (z, d) ∩ E(s)||S (z, d)| (28)
≤
∑
s,
d:|d−nq|≤nδ˜n
z∈T (n)
δ˜n
J(s | z, d)P(z, d) · |S (z, d) ∩ E(s)||S (z, d)| (29)
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+
∑
s,d
z<T (n)
δ˜n
J(s | z, d)P(z, d) (30)
+
∑
s,z
d:|d−nq|>nδ˜n
J(s | z, d)P(z, d), (31)
since
|S (z,d)∩E(s)|
|S (z,d)| ≤ 1.
Now, observe that we can choose δ˜n such that (30) and (31) are typicality conditions, and more specifically
lim
n→∞
((30) + (31)) ≤ lim
n→∞
(
Pr
(
Z < T (n)
δ˜n
)
+ Pr
(
|D − nq| > nδ˜n
))
= 0.
On the other hand, to show that (29) (and thus (27)) also approaches zero as n increases, we make use of the
following lemma, whose proof appears in Appendix B.
Lemma V.6. Let the codewords x1, . . . , xM be constructed as above. Then, for any z ∈ T (n)δ˜n and s ∈ F
n
2
, n sufficiently
large, and d such that |d − nq| ≤ δ˜nn,
|S (z, d) ∩ E(s)| ≤ 2n(H(q)−H(p)−7.5δn). (32)
Combining Corollary V.5 and Lemma V.6, we see that
|S (z, d) ∩ E(s)|
|S (z, d)| ≤ (n + 1)
82−0.5nδn (33)
which converges to 0 since 0.5nδn = −0.5nδ˜n log2 δ˜n/2 ≥ 0.5
√
n log2 n. Since (33) also serves as an upper bound
for (29), we are done.

Remark V.7. The authors of [7] examine capacity under the following model: the adversary views the transmitted
codeword through a BSC(q), and decides on a state sequence s such that ‖s‖ ≤ tn for fixed parameter t (to avoid
confusion, we use “t” rather than “p” as used in [7]). This state sequence is added to x and sent noiselessly to
the receiver. This differs from our model in two significant ways: (1) the adversary is power constrained and the
no-adversary case is noiseless, and (2) error correction rather than authentication is considered.
Consider this model in the authentication setting. Because the channel is not overwritable for any power constraint
t, the oblivious case of q = 1/2 yields an authentication capacity of Cauth = 1, the non-adversarial capacity, by
Theorem II.4. In fact, Theorem V.2 shows that even if the adversary can flip any number of bits (i.e. t = 1), as long
as q > 0, the authentication capacity is equal to 1. Interestingly, the power constraint t, which is instrumental in
the general AVC case, is immaterial in the authentication case.
B. When the adversary is less myopic than the receiver
Now, suppose that the non-adversarial channel between legitimate users is the worse channel. In this case, the
authentication capacity is dependent on whether the encoder must be deterministic, or allowed to be stochastic.
Theorem V.8. If 0 ≤ q ≤ p ≤ 1/2, and the encoder is deterministic, Cauth = 0.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that if 0 ≤ q ≤ p ≤ 1/2, UZ|X is stochastically degraded with respect to WY |X,S=s0
and the channel is I-overwritable: to see I-overwritability, choose PS |X′,X to be deterministic such that s = x′ ⊕ x.
Then, by Theorem III.3, Cauth = 0. 
Remark V.9. The authors of [7] show that for their similar model (which was detailed above in Remark V.7), if q <
p, then the deterministic coding capacity is equal to the capacity of the channel with an omniscient adversary. This
is also what we have shown for authentication (and our modified model) in Theorem V.8, since the authentication
capacity of the MBACp,q=0 is equal to zero.
By the comments at the end of Remark V.1 and Theorem III.1, if q = 0 or p = 1/2, the authentication capacity
of the MBACp,q is zero, regardless of the type of encoder. However, allowing a stochastic encoder, we can achieve
positive capacity as long as q > 0 and p < 1/2. Similarly to the strategy in Example III.4, we will send our
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initial codeword, t, through an artificial channel, before sending that through the channels UZ|X and WY |X,S . Here,
however, there must be some asymmetry to our artificial channel; otherwise the error pattern of the artificial channel
is independent of ti, and the adversary may choose s = ti ⊕ t j to reliably deceive the decoder.
Theorem V.10. If 0 < q ≤ p < 1/2, and the encoder is allowed to be stochastic, Cauth = 1 − H(p), where this
authentication capacity holds with error probability measured either as average or maximum over all messages.
Notice that we state the capacity holds even if we consider maximum error probability over all messages: that
is, considering error to be supJ emax(J). Since the maximum error approaching zero with increasing block length
implies average error doing the same, this is a stronger statement. We are able to make such a statement here because
we may assume the adversary knows exactly which message is being sent, and claim that we can authenticate even
in this case.
Theorem V.10 converse proof. As before, since any authentication code must also be an error-correcting code for
the underlying non-adversarial channel, we have Cauth ≤ CBSC(p) = 1 − H(p). 
For this case, we will again strengthen the adversary slightly in order to simplify some arguments. Specifically,
we assume that the adversary can determine the message i with perfect accuracy, and we allow the adversary’s
choice of distribution, JS n|Zn , to be a function of the exact joint type of ti, the transmitted word x, and the observed
sequence z.
We first present a result that will allow us to choose a good codebook; the proof of the following lemma may
be found in Appendix C.
Lemma V.11. Let PY |T be a discrete memoryless channel with capacity C > 0 and capacity-achieving input
distribution PT . Let R > 0 such that R < C, let ǫ > 0 be sufficiently small, let n be sufficiently large, and let
M := 2nR. Then there exist codewords t1, . . . , tM ∈ τT such that
(a) for any type class τTT ′S , i ∈ [M], and any sequence s,
|{ j : (ti, t j, s) ∈ τTT ′S }| ≤ 2n|R−I(T ′;TS )|
+
+nǫ , (34)
(b) H(Ti | T j) ≥ ǫ for all i , j, where Ti and T j are artificial random variables with joint distribution given by the
empirical distribution of ti and t j, and
(c) with a typical set decoder, the maximum error probability for transmission over PY |T is bounded above by ǫ.
We now prove achievability.
Theorem V.10 achievability proof. Let 0 < q ≤ p < 1/2. Let γ, δ > 0 be sufficiently small, and let R := C′−δ where
C′ is the capacity of a binary asymmetric channel, BAC(p, γ + p − 2γp). The BAC(p, γ + p − 2γp) is equivalent
to a Z-channel with crossover probability γ followed by a BSC(p). We construct a (M := 2nR, n) code family with
vanishing probability of error using Lemma V.11.
Encoding: Let PT ∼Bernoulli(α), with α chosen according to the capacity-achieving distribution of the BAC(p, γ+
p−2γp), and choose a codebook t1, . . . , tM as in Lemma V.11. In order to send message i ∈ [M], we pass ti through
VX|T , a Z-channel with V(0 | 1) = γ, and V(1 | 0) = 0.
Decoding: Let ǫ > 0 be sufficiently small. Upon receiving vector y ∈ Fn
2
, decode to message i if and only if i is unique
such that (ti, y) ∈ T (n)ǫ (T,Y), where (T,Y) ∼ PT ×PY |T , where PT ∼Bernoulli(α) and PY |T is given by WY |X,S=s0×VX|T .
Probability of error analysis: Let e1(ti, x, s) be the probability i does not satisfy the decoding requirement, assuming
message i is chosen, x is sent, and s is transmitted by the adversary, and let e2(ti, x, s) be the probability that some
j ∈ [M], j , i satisfies the decoding requirement, assuming message i is chosen, x is sent, and s is transmitted by
the adversary. In other words,
e1(ti, x, s) = W(φ
−1(i)c | x, s) and e2(ti, x, s) = W(φ−1(0, i)c | x, s).
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Allowing the adversary to know ti, z and Pti,X,z, we have
e(i, J) = EX|ti

∑
z
U(z | X)J(s0 | z, ti, Pti,X,z)e1(ti,X, s0) +
∑
s,s0
∑
z
U(z | X)J(s | z, ti, Pti,X,z)e2(ti,X, s)
 (35)
=
∑
x,z
P(x | ti)U(z|x)
J(s0|z, ti, Pti,x,z)e1(ti, x, s0) +
∑
s,s0
J(s|z, ti, Pti,x,z)e2(ti, x, s)
 (36)
=
∑
x,z
P(x, z | ti)
J(s0|z, ti, Pti ,x,z)e1(ti, x, s0) +
∑
s,s0
J(s|z, ti, Pti,x,z)e2(ti, x, s)
 (37)
=
∑
x,z
(ti ,x,z)∈T (n)ǫ (T,X,Z)
P(x, z | ti)
J(s0|z, ti, Pti,x,z)e1(ti, x, s0) +
∑
s,s0
J(s|z, ti, Pti,x,z)e2(ti, x, s)
 (38)
+
∑
x,z
(ti ,x,z)<T (n)ǫ (T,X,Z)
P(x, z | ti)
J(s0|z, ti, Pti,x,z)e1(ti, x, s0) +
∑
s,s0
J(s|z, ti, Pti,x,z)e2(ti, x, s)
 , (39)
where (37) follows because T ❝ X ❝ Z is a Markov chain. Consider (39). With high probability in n, (Ti,X,Z)
lies in the typical set. Thus, since
(39) ≤
∑
x,z
(ti,x,z)<T (n)ǫ (T,X,Z)
P(x, z | ti) = P
{
(Ti,X,Z) < T (n)ǫ (T, X,Z) | Ti = ti
}
,
we have that (39) approaches 0 as n → ∞. Notice that
(38) ≤
∑
s,x,z
(ti ,x,z)∈T (n)ǫ (T,X,Z)
P(z | ti)J(s|z, ti, Pti ,x,z)P(x | ti, z)W(φ−1(i)c | x, s) (40)
If for every fixed choice of s and z we have
∑
x P(x | ti, z)W(φ−1(i)c | x, s) → 0 as n → ∞, where the sum is
over x’s such that (ti, x, z) ∈ T (n)ǫ (T, X,Z), then (38) approaches zero asymptotically. Thus, it is sufficient to prove
the following lemma, which states that any choice of s given knowledge of ti and z causes decoding failure for
a vanishing fraction of the transmissions x that are consistent with ti and z. A proof of the lemma appears in
Appendix D.
Lemma V.12. Let i, z, and s be fixed such that (ti, z) ∈ T (n)ǫ , and suppose X and Y are drawn from the distribution
P(x | ti, z)W(y | x, s), where P(x | ti, z) is the conditional distribution for X from the Markov chain T ❝ X ❝ Z.
Then,
P
{
∃ j , i : (t j,Y) ∈ T (n)ǫ
}
→ 0 as n → ∞.
With Lemma V.12 in hand, letting δ and γ approach zero gives us a code with rate arbitrarily close to limδ,γ→0C′−
δ = 1 − H(p) and vanishing error probability, proving achievability.

VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we considered keyless authentication over an AVC where the adversary sees the transmitted sequence
through a noisy channel UZ|X . We introduced the channel condition U-overwritability as a generalization of the
oblivious-adversary condition overwritability, and showed that U-overwritability is a sufficient condition for zero
authentication capacity. We also showed that if users are restricted to deterministic encoders, there are additional
cases in which the authentication capacity is zero: namely, when the adversary is able to reliably decode, and the
AVC is vulnerable to an omnicient adversary (I-overwritable). However, allowing for stochastic encoders can allow
for positive authentication capacity in these cases.
Next, we compared adversaries to one another, and showed that once an adversary has a channel UZ|X such that
the AVC is U-overwritable, the AVC is also U-overwritable for any less degraded channel to the adversary. As
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a consequence, if an AVC is overwritable, it is also U-overwritable for every UZ|X . This can allow us to quickly
determine U-overwritability for a large group of channels to the adversary.
Finally, we examined a myopic binary adversarial channel in detail. Interestingly, for this case the authentication
capacity is always equal to the non-adversarial capacity of the underlying channel as long as the channel to
the adversary is not perfect and we allow stochastic encoders. Furthermore, in this case the maximum error
authentication capacity is equal to the average error authentication capacity. If we restrict to deterministic encoders,
the authentication capacity drops to zero for the cases in which the non-adversarial channel between users is
stochastically degraded with respect to the channel to the adversary, as the adversary is essentially omniscient
in this scenario. An open question is whether U-overwritability is more generally a necessary condition for zero
authentication capacity when stochastic encoders are allowed, and whether the authentication capacity is always
equal to the non-adversarial capacity when it is positive.
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Appendix A
Lemma V.4
First we derive two lemmas which will help considerably in establishing Lemma V.4 by simplifying the analysis
that results from using Bernstein’s trick when bounding sums of random variables.
Lemma A.1. Let 0 < t, p < 1, let s ∈ {−1, 1}, and let B1, . . . , Bn be independent Bernoulli(p) random variables.
min
h>0
E
[
eh
∑n
i=1 sBi
]
ehsnt
≤ e−nD(t||p),
where D(t||p) := t ln
(
t
p
)
+ (1 − t) ln
(
1−t
1−p
)
.
Proof. First, note that since the Bi’s are independent, for fixed h > 0 we have
E
[
eh
∑n
i=1 sBi
]
=
n∏
i=1
E
[
ehsBi
]
= (1 − p + pehs)n.
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Thus,
min
h>0
E
[
eh
∑n
i=1 sBi
]
ehsnt
= min
h>0
(
(1 − p + pehs)ne−hsnt
)
. (41)
Solving, we find that as long as t < 1,
min
h>0
E
[
eh
∑n
i=1 sBi
]
ehsnt
≤ e−nD(t||p). (42)
since the only critical point of (41) occurs at h = s ln
t(1−p)
p(1−t) and the second derivative is always positive. 
In order to apply Lemma A.1 to obtain Lemma V.4 it will be helpful to lower bound MD(t||p).
Lemma A.2. Let t := ζp for some positive number ζ ∈ (0, 1). Then,
D(t||p) ≥ p(ζ ln ζ − ζ + 1).
Proof. Borrowing from [17, Lemma 17.9], observe that D(ζp||p) is a convex function of p, and thus a linear
approximation at p = 0 will provide a lower bound. Therefore,
D(t||p) ≥ D(0||0) + dD(ζp||p)
dp
∣∣∣∣∣
p=0
p = (ζ ln ζ − ζ + 1)p.

Proof of Lemma V.4. Fix z ∈ τZ and suppose all codewords Xi are independently chosen uniformly at random from
τX . Before continuing further, we will show that the there exists a conditional type set τX|Z(z) such that the set of
all messages Hamming distance d from z is equal to {i : xi ∈ τX|Z(z)} since τX, τZ , and d are fixed. Indeed, define
τX|Z(z) by
pX|Z(1|0) = d
2npZ(0)
+
1
2
− pX(0)
2pZ(0)
(43)
pX|Z(0|1) = d
2npZ(1)
+
1
2
− pX(1)
2pZ(1)
. (44)
For any x ∈ τX that is distance d from z, observe that d can be written as d0+d1, where d0 is the number on indices
where z is 0 and x is 1, and d1 is the be the number of indices where z is 1 and x is 0. Furthermore, because d0
and d1 must satisfy the linear equations
npZ(0) + d1 − d0 = npX(0) (45)
d1 + d0 = d, (46)
we have
d0 =
d + n[pZ(0) − pX(0)]
2
(47)
d1 =
d + n[pZ(1) − pX(1)]
2
, (48)
and we see that the empirical distributions pX|Z(1|0) and pX|Z(0|1) are as in equations (43) and (44) above. We
conclude that x ∈ τX|Z(z). Because x was chosen arbitrarily from the type class, we see that any codeword distance
d from z must also be in τX|Z(z). Now, let
Ai =

1 if Xi ∈ τX|Z(z),
0 else,
so that we may write |{i : ‖z ⊕ Xi‖ = d}| =
∑M
i=1 Ai. Recall that X1, . . . ,XM are independent, and note that by [17,
Lemma 2.5],
2n(H(X|Z)−ǫ) ≤ |τX|Z(z)|, and |τX | ≤ 2nH(X),
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where ǫ = 4
log2(n+1)
n
. We conclude that the Ai are independent Bernoulli(b) random variables, where
b ≥ |τX|Z(z)||τX |
≥ 2−n(I(X;Z)+ǫ).
Hence, the probability that there are fewer than ⌊2n(R−I(X;Z)−2ǫ)⌋ messages distance d from z ∈ τZ is equal to
Pr
(∑M
i=1 Ai < ⌊2n(R−I(X;Z)−2ǫ)⌋
)
.
Notice that if R < I(X;Z) + 2ǫ, then ⌊2n(R−I(X;Z)−2ǫ)⌋ = 0. Since the Ai’s are nonnegative, we have
Pr

M∑
i=1
Ai < 0
 = 0. (49)
On the other hand, if R > I(X;Z) + 2ǫ then:
Pr

M∑
i=1
Ai <
⌊
2n(R−I(X;Z)−2ǫ)
⌋ ≤ Pr

M∑
i=1
Ai < 2
n(R−I(X;Z)−2ǫ)
 (50)
= min
h>0
Pr
(
e−h
∑M
i=1 Ai > e−h2
n(R−I(X;Z)−2ǫ))
(51)
≤ min
h>0
E
[
e−h
∑M
i=1 Ai
]
eh2
n(R−I(X;Z)−2ǫ)
(52)
≤ e−MD(2−n(I(X;Z)+2ǫ)||2−n(I(X;Z)+ǫ)) (53)
≤ e−2n(R−I(X;Z)−ǫ)[1−2−nǫ(1+nǫ ln 2)] (54)
where (51) is from Bernstein’s trick; (52) is from Markov’s Inequality; (53) is from Lemma A.1 and the convexity
of divergence (since 2−n(I(X;Z)+2ǫ) < 2−n(I(X;Z)+ǫ) < b); and (54) is Lemma A.2. Combining the bounds (49) and (54),
we obtain
Pr
(
|{i : ‖z ⊕ Xi‖ = d}| < ⌊2n(R−I(X;Z)−2ǫ)⌋
)
≤ e−2nǫ[1−2−nǫ (1+nǫ ln 2)] = e−(n+1)4+1+4 ln(n+1). (55)
From the union bound, then,
Pr
(
∃z such that |{i : ‖z ⊕ Xi‖ = d}| < ⌊2n(R−I(X;Z)−2ǫ)⌋
)
≤ e−(n+1)4+nR+1+4 ln(n+1). (56)
Since (56) goes to zero as n goes to infinity, we find that, with high probability, the number of messages that are
distance d from any z ∈ τZ is at least
⌊
2n(R−I(X;Z)−2ǫ)
⌋
=
⌊
1
(n + 1)8
2n(R−I(X;Z))
⌋
,
where pX,Z is defined by the conditional distributions in (43) and (44). 
Appendix B
Lemma V.6
Proof of Lemma V.6. We can upper bound the left-hand side of (32) by splitting into different type classes. Namely,
|S (z, d) ∩ E(s)| ≤
∑
X,X′,S ,Z
|{i : (xi, x j, s, z) ∈ τXX′S Z for some j , i}|,
where the binary random variables X, X′, S ,Z satisfy
E[X] = 1/2, E[X′] = 1/2, E[X ⊕ Z] = d/n, E[X ⊕ S ⊕ X′] ≤ p + δ˜n. (57)
Let ǫ1,n > 0 be such that ǫ1,n < 0.5δn. Applying Lemma V.3 with (S ,Z) in place of S , we have
|{i : (xi, x j, s, z) ∈ τXX′S Z for some j , i}| ≤ 2n|R−I(X;X′S Z)+|R−I(X′;S Z)|
+|++nǫ1,n . (58)
We now want to bound this for random variables satisfying (57). In particular, consider two cases. First, if R ≤
I(X′; SZ), then we have that
∣∣∣R − I(X;X′SZ) + |R − I(X′; SZ)|+∣∣∣+ is equal to
=
∣∣∣R − I(X;X′SZ)∣∣∣+
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≤
∣∣∣R − I(X; S ⊕ X′)∣∣∣+ (59)
≤
∣∣∣R − (1 − H(p + δ˜n))∣∣∣+ (60)
≤ |R − 1 + H(p) + δn|+ (61)
= 0, (62)
where (59) follows from the data processing inequality, (60) from the last condition of (57), and (62) holds by the
definition of R. Second, if R > I(X′; SZ), then we have that
∣∣∣R − I(X;X′SZ) + |R − I(X′; SZ)|+∣∣∣+ is equal to
=
∣∣∣2R − I(X;X′SZ) − I(X′; SZ)∣∣∣+
=
∣∣∣2R − I(X; SZ) − I(X;X′ |SZ) − I(X′; SZ)∣∣∣+ (63)
=
∣∣∣2R − I(X; SZ) − I(X′;XSZ)∣∣∣+ (64)
≤
∣∣∣2R − I(X;Z) − I(X′;X ⊕ S )∣∣∣+ (65)
≤
∣∣∣2R − (1 − H(d/n)) − (1 − H(p + δ˜n))∣∣∣+ (66)
≤ |2R + H(d/n) + H(p) − 2 + δn|+ (67)
≤ |H(d/n) − H(p) − 9δn|+ (68)
≤ H(d/n) − H(p) − 9δn (69)
≤ H(q) − H(p) − 8δn, (70)
where (63) and (64) follow from the chain rule, (65) from the data processing inequality, (66) from the last two
conditions of (57), and (69) holds for n sufficiently large. In either case, (58) is upper bounded by 2n(H(q)−H(p)−8δn+ǫ1,n).
Since ǫ1,n < 0.5δn and there are only a polynomial number of types, for sufficiently large n, we have shown (32).

Appendix C
Lemma V.11
In order to prove Lemma V.11, we first give an extension of Lemma 3 of [16].
Lemma C.1. Let PY |T be a discrete memoryless channel with capacity C > 0 and capacity-achieving input
distribution PT . Let ǫ
′′ > 0, let R′, ǫ′ > 0 such that ǫ′ < R′ < C, let n be sufficiently large, and let M := 2nR
′
. Then
there exist t1, . . . , tM of length n from type class τT that simultaneously satisfy the following for any type class
τTT ′S :
(1) for any i ∈ [M], and any sequence s,
|{ j : (ti, t j, s) ∈ τTT ′S }| ≤ 2n|R′−I(T ′;TS )|
+
+nǫ′ , (71)
(2) if I(T ;T ′) − R′ > ǫ′, then
1
M
|{i : (ti, t j) ∈ τTT ′ for some j , i}| ≤ 2−(ǫ′/2)n, and (72)
(3) with a typical set decoder, the average error probability for transmission over PY |T is bounded above by ǫ′′.
Proof. The existence of a codebook having properties (1) and (2) follows directly from Lemma 3 of [16]. In fact,
not only does there exist such a codebook, but a codebook whose codewords are chosen uniformly at random from
τT has both properties with high probability. Furthermore, choosing codewords uniformly at random from τT will
result with high probability in a code whose average error probability over PY |T vanishes as block length goes to
infinity. Thus, a randomly chosen codebook simultaneously possesses properties (1)-(3) with high probability. 
To construct a codebook satisfying (a)-(c) of Lemma V.11, we will take a codebook with properties (1)-(3) of
Lemma C.1, and eliminate all codewords ti such that the decoding error probability given ti was sent is bounded
away from zero, and also all ti for which there exists j , i with the property that H(Ti | T j) < ǫ, where Ti and T j
are artificial random variables with joint distribution given by the empirical distribution of ti and t j.
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Proof of Lemma V.11. Let ǫ, δ > 0 be sufficiently small, with δ < ǫ < δ′, where δ′ := C−R
2
and Y is distributed
according to PY |T . Let ǫ′ > 0 be such that ǫ′ < min{R + δ, ǫ − δ, δ′ − ǫ}. Letting R′ = R + δ, Lemma C.1 states that
there exists a codebook of size 2n(R+δ) from the type class τT that satisfies properties (1)-(3), letting ǫ
′′ := ǫ/2 in
property (3).
For each type class τTT ′ such that H(T |T ′) < ǫ,
I(T ;T ′) − (R + δ) > H(T ) − H(T |T ′) − (R + δ) (73)
> H(T ) − H(T |T ′) − (C − δ′) (74)
= H(T ) − H(T |T ′) − I(T ;Y) + δ′ (75)
= H(T |Y) − H(T |T ′) + δ′ (76)
> H(T |Y) + δ′ − ǫ (77)
> ǫ′. (78)
Thus, by property (2) of Lemma C.1, for each such τTT ′ ,
1
M
|{i : (ti, t j) ∈ τTT ′ for some j , i}| ≤ 2−(ǫ′/2)n.
Since there are a polynomial number of joint type classes τTT ′ with H(T |T ′) < ǫ,
1
M
|{i : (ti, t j) ∈ τTT ′ for some T,T ′ s.t. H(T |T ′) < ǫ, and some j , i}| ≤ nO(1)2−(ǫ′/2)n. (79)
Removing all codewords ti such that i falls in the set on the left hand side of (79), we have at least 2
n(R+δ)
(
1 − nO(1)2−(ǫ′/2)n
)
codewords remaining. For n sufficiently large,
1 − nO(1)2−(ǫ′/2)n ≥ 2−(δ/2)n.
Thus, the number of remaining codewords is at least 2n(R+δ/2).
With our initial choice of codebook sequence, the average error probability of the code for transmission over
PY |T with typical set decoding was bounded above by ǫ/2; this remains true for our now-smaller codebook of
size 2n(R+δ/2). Denote the average error probability for this new codebook by Pne . For each codeword ti remaining
in the codebook, there is an associated decoding error probability Pne(ti). Remove from the codebook half of the
codewords: in particular, those that have the highest error probabilities. We claim that for each remaining codeword,
we have Pne(ti) ≤ 2Pne ≤ ǫ. Indeed, were this not the case, then
Pne =
∑
i∈S Pne(ti) +
∑
i∈[2n(R+δ/2)]\S Pne(ti)
2n(R+δ/2)
>
ǫ + (2n(R+δ/2)−1 · ǫ)
2n(R+δ/2)
> ǫ/2,
where S is the set of 2n(R+δ/2)−1 codewords with smallest error probability. Thus, we conclude that each remaining
codeword in our codebook of size 2n(R+δ/2)−1 has error probability bounded above by ǫ. Since 2n(R+δ/2)−1 > 2nR
for n sufficiently large, we may select M := 2nR codewords from those remaining, and these have maximum error
probability bounded above by ǫ. Call these t1, . . . , tM .
Finally, we show (a). Let τTT ′S be some type class. If R+ δ > I(T
′;TS ), Lemma C.1 gives that for any i ∈ [M],
and any sequence s,
|{ j : (ti, t j, s) ∈ τTT ′S }| ≤ 2n|(R+δ)−I(T ′;TS )|
+
+nǫ′ (80)
= 2n(R−I(T
′;TS ))+n(δ+ǫ′) (81)
< 2n|R−I(T
′;TS )|++nǫ , (82)
where (82) follows from the upper bound ǫ′ < ǫ − δ. On the other hand, if R + δ ≤ I(T ′;TS ), then R < I(T ′;TS ),
and
|{ j : (ti, t j, s) ∈ τTT ′S }| ≤ 2n|(R+δ)−I(T ′;TS )|
+
+nǫ′ (83)
= 2n|R−I(T
′;TS )|++nǫ′ (84)
< 2n|R−I(T
′;TS )|++nǫ . (85)

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Appendix D
Lemma V.12
Proof of Lemma V.12. We will use the following notation: if |A − B| < ǫ, we write A ǫ= B. For distributions, “ ǫ=”
indicates that this holds for each set of realizations of the random variables involved.
Let τTZS be the joint type class for the sequences ti, z, and s. Note that here T,Z, S represent artificial random
variables. We will use Q to denote the distribution of these artificial random variables (e.g. Q(t, z, s) is the joint
type), and P to denote the actual distribution that variables are drawn from. So, for example, we can assume that
ti, z are jointly typical with respect to P(t, z), i.e., Q(t, z)
ǫ
= P(t, z). Let X,Y be random vectors drawn from the
distribution
P(x|ti, z)W(y|x, s) (86)
where P(x|ti, z) is the conditional distribution for X from the Markov chain T ❝ X ❝ Z. We wish to upper bound
P
{
∃ j , i : (t j,Y) ∈ T (n)ǫ
}
. (87)
We can split this probability based on the joint type class of (ti, t j, z, s,X,Y), restricted to those for which t j is
jointly typical with Y: ∑
τTT ′ZS XY
s.t. τT ′Y⊂T (n)ǫ
P
{
∃ j , i : (ti, t j, z, s,X,Y) ∈ τTT ′ZS XY
}
. (88)
Since there are only polynomially many types, we only need to show that each of the probabilities in (88) is expo-
nentially vanishing. Note that, by the law of large numbers, for n sufficiently large, Q(x, y|t, z, s) ǫ= P(x|t, z)W(y|x, s).
Given any joint type, we may write
P
{
∃ j , i : (ti, t j, z, s,X,Y) ∈ τTT ′ZS XY
}
≤
∑
j,i s.t
(ti,t j,z,s)∈τTT ′ZS
P
{
(ti, t j, z, s,X,Y) ∈ τTT ′ZS XY
}
≤ |{ j , i : (ti, t j, z, s) ∈ τTT ′ZS }|2n(−I(XY ;T ′|TZS )+ǫ) (89)
≤ 2n(|R−I(T ′;S TZ)|+−I(XY ;T ′|S TZ)+2ǫ) (90)
where (89) follows from the joint typicality lemma, and (90) follows from our choice of codebook satisfying Lemma
V.11.
We now have two cases: the first is that R ≥ I(T ′; STZ). If this holds, then
P
{
∃ j , i : (ti, t j, z, s,X,Y) ∈ τTT ′ZS XY
}
≤ 2n(R−I(T ′;S TZ)−I(XY ;T ′|S TZ)+2ǫ) (91)
= 2n(R−I(T
′;S TZXY)+2ǫ) (92)
≤ 2n(R−I(T ′;Y)+2ǫ). (93)
Recall that τT ′Y ⊂ T (n)ǫ , and so I(T ′;Y) ≥ C′ − ǫ′ for some ǫ′ > 0 such that ǫ′ → 0 as ǫ → 0. Thus, for ǫ sufficiently
small, R < I(T ′;Y) and I(T ′;Y) − R > 2ǫ simultaneously, so (93) vanishes exponentially, and we are done.
The second case is that R < I(T ′; STZ). Here, (90) reduces to
P
{
∃ j , i : (ti, t j, z, s,X,Y) ∈ τTT ′ZS XY
}
≤ 2n(−I(XY ;T ′|S TZ)+2ǫ). (94)
If I(XY;T ′|TZS ) > 2ǫ, (94) will be exponentially vanishing, and we are again done. So, now consider just the type
classes τTT ′ZS XY such that I(XY;T
′|TZS ) ≤ 2ǫ. That is, the Markov chain T ′ → STZ → XY approximately holds
for the empirical distribution, so that
Q(t, t′, z, s, x, y) ǫ
′
= Q(t, t′, z, s)Q(x, y|t, z, s). (95)
Where ǫ′ goes to 0 with ǫ. By the assumption that Q(x, y|t, z, s) ǫ= P(x|t, z)W(y|x, s), we have
Q(t, t′, z, s, x, y)
ǫ2
= Q(t, t′, z, s)P(x|t, z)W(y|x, s) = Q(t, z)P(x|t, z)Q(t′, s|t, z)W(y|x, s) (96)
where ǫ2 = ǫ
′ + ǫ. We can also assume that Q(t, x, z) ǫ= P(t, x)U(z|x), and Q(x|t, z) ǫ= P(x|t, z) so we have
Q(t, t′, z, s, x, y)
ǫ3
= P(t, x)U(z|x)Q(t′, s|t, z)W(y|x, s), (97)
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where ǫ3 = ǫ
′ + 3ǫ. In addition, we know that
Q(t′, y) ǫ=
∑
x
P(t′, x)W(y|x, s0). (98)
Therefore, ∑
t,x,z,s
P(t, x)U(z|x)Q(t′, s|t, z)W(y|x, s) ǫ4=
∑
x
P(t′, x)W(y|x, s0) (99)
where ǫ4 = 16(ǫ
′ + 3ǫ) + ǫ. However, we will show that as a consequence of our code design, there is in fact no
conditional distribution Q(t′, s|t, z) that satisfies the above. In particular, we can make ǫ as small as we like, so it
is enough to show that if Q(t′, s|t, z) satisfies∑
t,x,z,s
P(t, x)U(z|x)Q(t′, s|t, z)W(y|x, s) =
∑
x
P(t′, x)W(y|x, s0) (100)
then Q(t′|t) = 1(t′ = t), which is a contradiction to our choice of codebook.
Define Y˜ = X ⊕ S , so the channel WY |X,S is broken down into a deterministic part from (X, S ) to Y˜, followed by
a BSC(p) from Y˜ to Y . We may then rewrite (100) as∑
t,x,z,s,y˜
P(t, x)U(z|x)Q(t′, s|t, z)1(y˜ = x ⊕ s)W(y|y˜) =
∑
x
P(t′, x)W(y|x, s0). (101)
Consider t′ = 0. By our encoding procedure, it is then the case that X = 0 deterministically, and we can write
∑
t,x,z,s,y˜
P(t, x)U(z|x)Q(t′ = 0, s|t, z)1(y˜ = x ⊕ s)W(y|y˜) =

1 − p y = 0,
p y = 1.
(102)
Define a(y˜) :=
∑
t,x,z,s P(t, x)U(z|x)Q(t′ = 0, s|t, z)1(y˜ = x ⊕ s). Since W(y|y˜) is a BSC(p), and p , 0, 1/2, then
the above equation simultaneously holding for y = 0 and y = 1 implies that a(0)(1 − p) + a(1)p = 1 − p and
a(0)p + a(1)(1 − p) = p. Solving this system yields a(1) = 0, or, expanded:∑
t,x,z,s
P(t, x)U(z|x)Q(t′ = 0, s|t, z)1(1 = x ⊕ s) = 0. (103)
Since each term in this sum is non-negative, they all must equal 0. In particular, suppose there exists a pair (z, s)
where Q(t′ = 0, s | t = 1, z) > 0. Then, noting that we only need to consider x = s ⊕ 1, so we have
P(t = 1, x = s⊕1)U(z | x = s⊕1)Q(t′ = 0, s | t = 1, z) = 0 which implies P(t = 1, x = s⊕1)U(z | x = s⊕1) = 0.
(104)
But this is impossible, since P(t = 1, x) > 0 for each x, and U(z | x) > 0 for each x (here we use the assumption
that 0 < q < 1). Thus, we must have Q(t′ = 0, s|t = 1, z) = 0 for all s, z. Therefore, Q(t′ = 0|t = 1) = 0, so
Q(t′ = 1|t = 1) = 1. Since T and T ′ must have the same marginal distribution of Q(t) = Q(t′) = 0.5 for all t, t′,
we have Q(t = 1|t′ = 1) = 1, which in turn implies that Q(t = 0 | t′ = 1) = 0, and Q(t′ = 1 | t = 0) = 0. In other
words, Q(t′|t) = 1(t′ = t). However, this is impossible based on the fact that our codebook satisfies Lemma V.11.
In other words, there is no consistent type class τTT ′ZS XY such that I(XY;T
′|STZ) ≤ 2ǫ. This completes the proof
of the lemma. 
